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Abstract. Decision analysis (DA) and the rich set of tools devel­
oped by researchers in decision making under uncertainty 
show great potential to penetrate the technological content of the 
products and services delivered by firms in a variety of industries 
as well as the business processes used to deliver those products 
and services to market. In this paper I describe work in progress 
at Sun Microsystems in the application of decision-analytic 
methods to Operational Decision Making (ODM) in its World­
Wide Operations (WWOPS) Business Management group. 
Working with members of product engineering, marketing, and 
sales, operations planners from \VWOPS have begun to use a 
decision-analytic framework called SCRAM (Supply Commu· 
nication/ Risk Assessment and Management) to structure and 
solve problems in product planning, tracking, and transition. 
Concepts such as information value provide a powerful method 
of managing huge information sets and thereby enable managers 
to focus attention on factors that matter most for their business. 
Finally, our process-oriented introduction of decision-analytic 
methods to Sun managers has led to a focused effort to develop 
decision support software based on methods from decision-mak­
ing under uncertainty. 
1.0 Operational Decision Making at Sun 
Microsystems 
Sun Microsystems, Inc., is a large, established provider of 
technology products such as workstations, servers , prin t­
ers, and computer storage devices, with annual revenues 
of nearly $7 billion dollars. Balancing supply and demand 
for Sun's products is difficult given the overall volatility of 
the technology marketplace, complex dynamics and 
uncertainties in customer preference, and extremely short 
product lifetimes� less than 18 months for most technol­
ogy products. In such a fast-paced business environment, 
an efficient, intelligent execution capability is critical to 
long-term business health. The wing of the company 
charged with building and maintaining overall execution 
capability is called World-Wide Operations (WWOPS), an 
or�anization comprising several lar ge groups such as Sup­
plier Management, Manufacturing, Logistics, Product 
Engineering, and Business Management. 
WWOPS Business Management is responsible for longer­
term business planning related to the design, manufactura­
bility, and delivery to market of Sun's products. It is not a 
tactical or logistics organization. Rather, it works with 
other groups such as Engineering, Marketing, and Sales to 
gather and manage assets to support introduction of new 
products, end-of-life transitions for older products, and 
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supply/demand balancing for what are called sustaining 
products. The trnnslation of executive-level decisions - to 
pursue particular product lines or to size existing businesses 
in particular ways, for example - into achievable plans 
which exhaustively take account of supply, technological, 
and market constraints poses a formidable challenge in oper­
ational decision making. 
Consider a quick case study: many believe that Apple's 
inability to measure and meet demand for its PowerPC line 
of computers during the fi seal 1995 year was the first and 
possibly largest blunder leading to its long and dangerous 
downturn. Because Apple thoroughly misjudged demand for 
PowerPC's, and because it had not positioned supply of 
components far enough in advance to adjust to the demand 
upturn, it suffered a prolonged beating in the marketplace as 
customers turned to competitors' products. Consequently, 
Apple's market share fell from a 1992 peak of 11.2% to 
6.7% as of the end of calendar year 1995, according to 
Dataquest, fnc. As Apple's difficulties vividly demonstrate, 
the stakes on technology product supply decisions can be 
extremely high. 
In this paper I describe work in progress at Sun in the appli­
cation of decision-analytic (DA) methods to operational 
decision making (ODM) in its WWOPS Business Manage­
ment group. Working with members of product engineering, 
marketing, and sales organizations, operations planners have 
begun to use a decision-analytic framework called SCRAM 
(Supply Communication/ Risk Assessment and Manage­
ment) to structure and solve problems in product planning, 
tracking, and transition. Concepts such as infonnation 
value provide a powerful mechanism for probing and man­
aging huge information sets and thereby enable managers to 
focus attention on factors that matter most for their business. 
Finally, our process-oriented introduction of decision-ana­
lytic methods to Sun managers has led to a focused effort to 
embed these decision making methodologies inside Business 
Management's information technology (IT) architecture. I'll 
briefly describe an effort underway to build decision support 
software based on methods from decision making under 
uncertainty to help manage Sun's large portfolio of technol­
ogy products. 
2.0 SCRAM 
In this section I describe in an anecdotal way the evolution of 
SCRAM and the lessons I've learned in bringing it online a<; 
a process-oriented framework for ODM at Sun. 
2.1 Rationale for SCRAM 
In the past, different groups within Sun's WWOPS organiza­
tion funded efforts based on Operations Research (OR) tech­
niques to address problems in operational strategy and 
planning. Managers had become disenchanted with such 
approaches, however, because they felt that those 
approaches were providing sophisticated answers to the 
wrong problems. They generally felt that OR tools 
abstracted away many important characteristics of the prob­
lems those tools purported to solve. Moreover, because man­
agers did not understand the inputs to those OR models, they 
distrusted the outputs. 
In some cases the consultants who built the models sug­
gested that understanding how the models worked was really 
beyond managers' expertise. Managers achieve their posi­
tions in part because they are extremely self-confident, and 
so it seems ill-advised to suggest that it is beyond their abil­
ity to understand a project they themselves have funded. 
Such an explanation seems especially wide of the mark, 
moreover, because Sun is in essence a technically-minded 
company. Many managers rise through the ranks from engi­
neering groups and are more than adequately equipped to 
understand the gist of a mathematical model. 
The Vice-President of Business Management, an engineer by 
training, thought about many of the diverse activities hap­
pening inside his or ganization-e.g., strategies for new prod­
uct introductions, end-of-life transition plans, processes for 
asset management- and he came to a simple realization. He 
saw that a core theme ran through all of the activities in his 
group, and that that theme was in many cases inadequately 
supported by many of the OR techniques WWOPS had tried 
using in the past As he succinctly put it," Decision making is 
the core of what we do. So don' tjust give me another model. 
Give me enhanced decision making capability." 
2.2 Development of SCRAM 
I was challenged to assess the state of the art of supply plan­
ning and management at Sun and to propose new processes, 
methods, and tools for doing it better. I began by interview­
ing a group of Platform Managers and Key Component Man­
agers to understand the key challenges before them. Platform 
Managers are responsible for developing supply strategies 
for desktop and server products. Key Component Managers 
manage critical components which are needed to make Sun's 
products or sold separately as peripherals ( e.g., memory 
chips, storage devices). Three clear themes quickly emerged. 
1. Communication: Planners must communicate with 
members of diverse groups such as Product Engineering, 
Marketing, and Sales to understand a very broad array of 
issues shaping the design and delivery of Sun's products 
in addition to the dynamics of market demand for those 
products. 
2. Credibility: Using data available in large databases and 
the information gathered through collaboration with 
members of other groups, planners must design credible 
long-term supply strategies which balance Sun's world­
wide supply/demand equation. 
3. Complexity: Planners have to build plans which explic­
itly take account of a wide range of complex and mostly 
uncertain factors under strict time constraints. In many 
situations, planners' initial reaction to such complexity is 
to say that an issue is "totally chaotic" or "completely 
random-there's really no way to get your head around 
this." 
I began to tell planners and anaJysts about decision anaJysis 
and utility modeling. I assumed that the connections between 
what I was telling them and the problems they faced would 
be immediately apparent. I was immediately and not-so-gen­
tly reality-checked. As one of the planners told me, "You're 
offering me caviar and champagne when I really need bread 
and water." Lesson #1 immediately sunk in: 
Lesson #1: VAliDA methods, if they are to be usefully 
applied in an organization, need to be wrapped inside the 
issues and concerns immediately relevant to the organiza­
tion. The problem context comes first; methodology follows. 
I quickly reaJized that I would have to change my approach. 
I began browsing internal home pages to learn about Sun's 
products. I badgered platform and key component managers 
for minutes to meetings, product specifications-anything 
that would help me to learn the nitty-gritty details of Sun's 
products. I also began collecting what I had heard in my 
interviews into a framework which could describe the state 
of the art for supply planning while also suggesting ways of 
doing it better. The result-or, more accurately, the work in 
progress- is SCRAM. SCRAM is a collection of three 
things: a glossary of shared terms; a set of simple distinc­
tions for categorizing the elements of supply plans; and 
finally, a library of agreed-upon knowledge maps and infh� 
ence diagrams for describing the structure of recurring chal­
lenges and problems. 
In fact, SCRAM is nothing more than a simple wrapper for 
decision anaJytic methods applied to ODM at Sun. By taking 
inventory of the essential factors related to supply plan­
ning-e.g., market growth, supply quality, customer migra­
tion�SCRAM provides a relatively stable vocabulary to 
enable planners to communicate more effectively and con­
sistently with experts in other parts of Sun's organization. 
The purpose of introducing distinctions such as Supply vs. 
Demand and Inside Sun vs. Outside Sun is to enable plan­
ners to understand their environment better and to establish 
clearer patterns for thinking about risk and uncertainty. 
Belief nets and inft uencc diagrams enable planners to formu­
late their problems using simple graphical models with qual­
itative flavor. Taken together, these three elements provide a 
basis for the development and rigorous analysis of short- and 
long-term supply strategies. 
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2.3 Dealing with uncertainty 
While I had some initial success in gathering those elements 
into a simple framework with a cute name, I still faced sig­
nificant obstacles. After some of my initial presentations to 
managers about SCRAM and its potential uses, my director 
told me that "SCRAM seems like nice conceptual frame­
work, but we need to see how you actually use this stuff." 
For example, I had talked about the idea of using a simple 
graphical model to describe uncertainty and I had given 
examples of belief networks and influence diagrams, but 
people had not really internalized the relevance or power of 
completing such an exercise. 
Working with a receptive Platform Strategy Manager, I 
decided to attack one of the central problems Sun was facing 
at the t1me, the Introduction of our new UltraSPARC line of 
workstation computers. UltraSPARC was a new computing 
paradigm, driven by the design of a new Ultra microproces­
sor chip with significantly higher computing speed; a new 
system model called UltraPort Architecture (UPA), which 
specified a new protocol for communication between the 
CPU and external graphics, network, memory, and storage 
devices; and an advanced graphics capability called Creator 
3D Graphics. The transition to UltraSPARC was a focused, 
company-wide commitment. The dynamics and complexities 
of the move carried huge risks. 
The central difficulties in any product transition include 
• assessing the pace and pulse of market demand using 
scarce market information-scarce because we do not yet 
have experience selling the new product; 
• monitoring the rate of migration in the customer base 
from sustaining products to new pnxtucts; 
• positioning assets for sustaining and new products to 
exploit commonalities in shared components and to man­
age uncertainties and constraints related to the use of new 
or unique components; 
• integrating knowledge from diverse comers of the orga­
nization to make tough operational decisions while 
simultaneously supporting company objectives-this 
involves distinguishing between what we would like to 
happen (our goal) from our best assessment of what is 
most likely to happen (our forecast); and 
• making trade-offs to (a) minimize risk in excess inven­
tory of highly expensive components such as micropro­
cessors, (b) maximize overall revenue, (c) preserve the 
stability of our supplier network, and (d) keep customers 
satisfied. 
I completed an intense knowledge engineering cycle with the 
Platform Manager in an attempt to make sense of some of 
the divergent signals we were receiving at the time from 
Marketing and Sales groups. It was interesting to observe the 
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effects of motivational and availability biases [Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974] when we approached those sources 
for more reti ned information. For example, it became clear 
that current products such as Spare 5's and Spare 20's were 
familiar not just to our customers but to the salespeople sell­
ing to our installed base of customers. Ultra is based on a 
new design and therefore required a new and mostly untested 
sales pitch. Additionally, salespeople receive bonuses based 
on the di!Terence between baseline targets and actual sales, 
so they have a strong incentive to set the bar low. Marketing 
people, meanwhile, are congenital optimists. High-tech mar­
keters do not advance in their careers by being skeptical of 
the technologies they promote; their professional success 
depends heavily on their ability to convince customers and 
other members of the corporation that the products they help 
manage are "best-of-breed," in high-tech parlance. 
I realized that Marketing and Sales groups were operating 
not simply from different assumptions but from radically dif­
ferent perspectives. Business Management's objective in this 
situation was to establish rules for clear communication so 
that we could understand and diagnose the source of dis­
agreement. Belief networks provided an excellent methodol­
ogy for depicting the elements of each perspective. They 
encouraged people to talk about the problem using a com­
mon representation with simple semantics. When skeptics 
argued that I was simply drawing a "mind map" or a "ftow 
diagram," I showed them how the knowledge map could be 
used analytically to capture a rich structure of probabilistic 
and functional dependencies. A few engineers working in 
product management and marketing found this approach par­
ticularly interesting and were inclined to give the results of 
our analyses a high level of credibility because the solution 
methodology appealed to their sense of technical rigor. 
It is important to emphasize Business Management's role in 
such an environment: while we are ultimately accountable 
for the Ultra supply strategy, several different groups were 
also responsible. Lesson #2 became apparent. 
Lesson #2: In ODM, the notion of a single Bayesian deci­
sion maker is an abstraction of limited use. A more r ealistic 
approach takes account of what I will call the decision par­
ticipants. Capturing their information and knowledge and 
explicitly including them throughout the decision-making 
cycle appears critical for the successful application of deci­
sion-theoretic methodologies in an organizational context. 
Figures l shows a belief network for the Ultra forecast from 
the Sales perspective. Bold-bordered nodes represent deter­
ministic nodes. 
FIGURE 1. Salespeoples' belief net for Ultra forecast. 
An important advantage of formulating the belief network 
model shown above was to identify and make explicit the 
dvnamics of Ultra sales in terms of different customer pro­
flies. There was a general feeling that Ultra sales would be 
constrained by the starting configurations of the computing 
environments in which users were already configured. Since 
UltraSPARC requires installation of the Solaris 2.5 operating 
system, different salespeople felt that this would be a strong 
gating factor on our ability to generate Ultra sales. Custom­
ers are slow to upgrade their operating systems (OS) because 
doing so in the past required forward-porting most of their 
basic applications. Though one of the advantages of Solaris 
2.5 was full binary compatibility with most existing applica­
tions, the perception of dif ficulty in moving to a new version 
of the OS persisted. Moreover, salespeople believed that the 
migration path would be harder for customers who were 
using the older SunOS operating system, while customers 
using Solaris 2.x (i.e., Solaris 2.0- Solaris 2.4) had a higher 
chance of upgrading to Ultra. 
After more discussion, salespeople agreed that these factors 
were fundamentally shaped by whether or not the customer 
was a technical user or a commercial client. Their intuition 
was that commercial customers running Sun OS would be the 
slowest movers to Ultra. The probabilistic structuring of 
conditional dependencies using a belief network also 
allowed us to integrate hard data (e.g., size of the installed 
base) with more subjective assessments (e.g., Ultra purchase 
preference). 
Finallv, we used the preceding model to sanity-check fore­
casts �f Ultra sales. In some cases, there were salespeople 
who had not participated in the knowledge engineering cycle 
but still submitted forecasts on total Ultra demand. If they 
submitted an Ultra forecast and quickly agreed to the assess­
ments driving the other parts of the model, then the number 
of new Ultra sales to customers outside the installed base 
became a matter of inference, as depicted in Figure 2. If the 
resulting distribution on Ultra sales to new customers lacked 
credibility, then the salespeople with the new forecasts were 
challenged to defend their numbers by re-examining their 
assumptions about the other elements of the model, e.g., pro­
viding a reason why the purchase preference of the average 
Ultra customer might be di fferent from the assessment they 
had previously agreed to. 
FIGURE 2. Sanity-checking the Ultra forecast. 
Figure 3 shows a belief network for Ultra sales from the 
Marketi ng perspective. 
FIGURE 3. Marketing's belief net for Ultra sales. 
As evinced in Figure 3, marketing people examine the mar­
ket from what seems to be a totally different level of abstrac­
tion. They generally analyze broader factors such as market 
size and market growth. In this case they also found it useful 
to assess Ultra sales relative to a drifting or cannibalizing 
effect between the current high-end product, Spare 20, and 
the newly available Ultra. 
Before using these to ls, Marketing and Sales groups had no 
dear, directed means of making sense of their divergent 
forecasts. The knowledge mapping approach gave Business 
Management an opportunity to defuse-at least partially-
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the passionate disagreements between the two sides by elicit­
ing their assumptions, depicting them in evocative graphical 
models, and performing the necessary analysis to derive 
more credible forecasts. Lesson #3 is an important one. 
Lesson #3: UIU·ertainty models such as belief networks can 
be used in ODM on a fast, flexible basis to provide structure 
in situatio ns characterized by ambiguity and disagreement. 
Evocative models such as these provide decision partici­
pants with a high level of clarity and consensus by forcing 
them to say what they mean and to mean what they say. 
From this point is was possible to extend the belief network 
models into an influence diagram to model the business deci­
sion of how to position assets to respond to uncertain 
demand for Ultra. The analysis incorporated cost and margin 
information regarding both low- and high-end products. It 
suggested strategies for positioning assets over different 
periods of time, the structuring of good contracts with sup­
pliers , and the identification of important variables to track 
as the transition continues. For proprietary reasons it is not 
possible to discuss these developments further. 
FIGURE 4. Integrating the forecast for Ultra demand into 
an influence diagram model for Ultra supply 
strategy. 
Ultra 
Supply 
Revenue, 
cost, inventory 
hold ing , 
capital expense 
It has been especially useful to gather these models into an 
evolving library of models for SCRAM as a means of 
record ing institutional rationale and of providing an audit 
trail on operational decisions. We have examined other prod­
uct transitions recently using the SCRAM framework with 
positive result<>; I am now leading a team which is working 
cross-functionally to embed this a pproach into the basic 
product planning, tracking, and transition cycle of the Stor­
age Business Unit. In contrast to the fairly static OR methods 
which Business Management had tested before, these deci­
sion-analytic approaches stand apart because they are 
dynamic and extensible. Managers and analysts who are 
accustomed to OR thinking worry that if they raise a new 
concern or introduce a new variable, then the entire house of 
cards will come tumbling down. It has been a challenge to 
get the users of SCRAM to stop searching for "the model" 
[Laskey, 1996] and to understand that the modeling possibil-
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ities with a UAI/DA approach are, practically speaking, limitless. 
Lesson #4: The SCRAM framework for ODM has begun to pr ovide 
enhanced decision-making capabilitv inside Sun's organization on 
a cross-functional basis. The chief benefits of SCRAM include 
improved communication among groups, increased credibility of 
our operational decisions and critical business forecasts, and a 
simple, coherent mechanism for coping with complexity. The belief 
networks and influence diagrams gathered inside the SCRAM 
library are extensible insofar as they provide modeling "chunks" 
which can be joined and rearranged very quickzy to support rapid 
model-building and analysis. Such an approach is absolutel,v nec­
essary to support Suns dynamic, rapidly evolving business. 
FIGURE 5. The SCRAM approachcreates a growing core of 
operational knowledge for better business decision­
making. 
3.0 
SCRAM 
Library of 
belief nets and 
influence diagram 
Information management and information 
value theory 
One of the organi zing principles Business Management has 
recently adopted for itself is that it is an information brokerage. 
Directors in WWOPS Business Management recently returned 
from their annual, two-day meeting where they assess the state of 
the business and plan the central initiatives and directives for the 
coming year. By the end of this meeting they had converged on a 
simple, unifying slogan: "Information is product." 
W hile simple, the statement aptly characterizes many of Business 
Management's activities. Members of Business Management col­
lect and synthesize information from different comers of the com­
pany and from various external sources, use it to make better 
portfolio planning decisions, and pass it on to other decision mak­
ers in the organization. Having embraced the metaphor of the 
information brokerage, executives began to understand the rele­
vance and power of value of information (VOl) as a means of 
managing and valuing ever-increasing information sets . 
The Ultra transition again provided a fertile ground for testing and 
applying this important concept. The fi nal model that evolved after 
the knowledge engineering cycle with the decision participants 
had 12 uncertainties. Using the algorithm developed in [Chavez 
and Hcnrion, 1994] and [Chavez, 1996], I was able to analyze the 
value of perfect and partial information on all of those uncertain­
tics. The concept elucidated in [Chavez, 19961 of a Relative 
Information Multiple (RIM) provides a flexible means of 
describing and measuring partial information value. In the Ultra 
problem, saturation effects in RIM curves helped us to identify the 
points beyond which further information-gathering was essentially 
overkill. It was useful to see some of the decision participants ' 
intuitions confirmed with the VOl analysis ; yet the VOI numbers 
also emphasized the importance of factors which were previously 
thought to be of lesser consequence. 
We have used VOI analysis at Sun as a means of identifying areas 
in which it might be useful to 
• hire consultants; 
• search through a database ; 
• extend the conversation with a knowledgable expert; 
• poll customers; 
• refi ne the model; 
• hire new people; or 
• acquire market research. 
We have performed several SCRAM analyses now, and each time I 
have provided VOl measures on critical uncertainties. I have 
observed an unexpected benefit from this kind of analysis: when 
provided with VOl measurements, managers feel an extra incen­
tive to gather information, hire outside help , or talk to other people 
within the organization because they had a dollars-and-cents mea­
sure of the importance of doing so. Resolving the uncertainty and 
adjusting their supply strategies in response to new information 
gives them a more prec ise, personal sense of the value they add to 
Sun's business. 
Lesson #5: In an information-rich context such as ODM at Sun, 
the concept of VOl and supporting algorithms for its estimation in 
lnrge decision models provide an effective mechanism for manag­
ing ever-expanding information sets. It also gives information­
gatherers in organizations a more precise, personal sense of the 
importance of reducing or r esolving uncertainty on variables sig­
nificant to their business decisions. 
FIGURE 6. Information in the form of distributed expertise 
inside the organization, data residing in large 
data warehouses, plans and forecasts of other 
groups, or market signals from the external 
business environment can be used to make 
better decisions in principle; concepts such as 
VOl and efficient algorithms for estimating VOl 
help decision makers make more intelligent use 
of that information in practice. 
4.0 Development of Decision Support 
Software 
In this section a briefly describe the thrust of a new effort to 
develop a decision support software environment for 
WWOPS Business Management at Sun. 
4.1 Process first, tools second 
I believe that management's disillusion with OR techniques 
had created a barrier in their willingness to try other analytic 
methods, and this in tum has slowed the pace of software 
development based on more promising approaches. My orig­
inal preference would have been to begin building computer 
systems for decision support immediately. Yet the develop­
ment of SCRAM and the application of concepts such as 
information value before investing large amounts of money 
in decision support has born fruit. Management has become 
aware of the power of these kinds of methods and then asked 
on their own if it would be possible to build tools to support 
our evolving decision-making processes. 
Having first developed a clear method for formulating and 
solving problems via frameworks such as SCRAM, we now 
have a clear rationale and much greater consensus about the 
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need for investment in accompanying tools for decision sup­
port. Echoing the Vice-President's original request, the point 
here is to deliver enhanced decision-making capability, not 
just another model. I conjecture that, if any software tool for 
decision support is to be really useful inside a large com­
pany, the tool's interface must be in synch with that or gani­
zation :� processes. At Sun, given initial success so far in 
getting people to think in terms of belief networks, the devel­
opment of software tools with a belief network or influence 
diagram interface will from their perspective appear to be the 
clear, natural choice. In other words, there is a higher chance 
that users will use and continue to use the tools we are now 
developing because the tools look and feel like the decision­
making processes they are intended to support. 
Lesson #6: To insure lasting success, the development of 
software to support business decision making must be in 
synch with the processes used to run the business. The inter­
faces for decision support software tools must match the 
or gani::;ation 's process language. 
A second benefit to the "process first, tools second" 
approach has been to develop an extremely precise view of 
the functionalities we need to embed in new software to sup­
port decision making in WWOPS Business Management. 
Certain methods developed in decision making under uncer­
tainty research, while perhaps useful in other areas, will be 
less useful in our problem domain. For example, managers 
and analysts are very comfortable speaking in terms of '80% 
chances' and 'even odds.' r think this has much to do with 
the culture of the or ganization- Sun is, as I've already 
noted, a technically-minded company. For example, market­
ing people create roadmaps to describe the migration of cus­
tomers from product X to product Y as percentage flows from 
X to Y; this essentially requires the notion of an average cus­
tomer calling a Sun sales rep and displaying some probabil­
ity p of requesting X and a probability ( I-p) of requesting Y. 
In fact it has been surprising for me to see how many of the 
plans and reports generated within the company present 
results which are understandable in explicitly probabilistic 
terms. Thus in our environment there is less need for qualita­
tive approaches to probability (e.g., semantic mappings of 
"more" or "less" likely, order-of-magnitude methods) 
because the business language already accommodates sub­
jective probabilistic assertions of chance. 
4.2 Data-mining 
While our ultimate goal is to create a decision support layer 
for WWOPS which employs methodologies from research in 
decision making under uncertainty, in fact our first steps in 
this area must focus a bit less on decision making and more 
on information synthesis. Sun has millions of rows and col­
umns of data on customers, suppliers, parts, platforms, book­
ings, backlog, billings, and shipments. Currently, much of 
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this data is not really used to drive decision making ; acqu ir­
ing i t requires knowledge of intricate data schema and the 
laborious development of database queries. The most impor­
tant task before us is  to create a more seamless, powerful 
way of getting at the data and mining it for valuable informa­
tion about product trends and market pulse. 
I have used SCRAM as a mechanism for introducing ana­
lysts at Sun to new, more powerful models for forecasting 
product demand and component consumption. Such models 
may rely on direct assessment ; where possi ble, however, we 
would also like to put those millions of rows and columns of 
data to work. Recentl y  developed methods for blending sta­
tistical forecasting with belief net inference [Dagum and 
Galper et a! , 1 995] provide an attmctive means of turning 
our data into information to drive busi ness decision-making. 
We have completed a smal l  pilot project dmwing on such 
techniques with promisi ng results, and have now acquired 
managerial commitment to develop a fully operational soft­
ware environment for the prediction of product trends and 
component consumption. Because planners and analysts are 
already familiar with belief nets, they have an immediate 
hook with which to grasp the essential concepts underlying 
these fairly sophisticated forecasting techniques. In keeping 
with the fundamental approach of SCRAM, they believe the 
forecasts because they have a qualitative understanding of 
the basic terms and tools used to build them . 
An important problem for Sun is to predict the consumption 
of its peripheml devices sold as options. Options are compo­
nents which do not ship with systems such as Spares or Ultra 
machines. Customers typically buy memory and storage 
options when upgmding systems that they already own. 
Options are therefore difficult to predict because their con­
sumption is not constrained by system shipments. Figure 5 
shows a simple belief net for total memory consumption, a 
combination of non-option memory confi gured with current 
system shipments and pure option memory sold directly to 
the install ed base of customers. 
Algorithms such as those described in rDagum and Galper et 
a! , 1 995] and [Dagum and Galper, 1995] can be used to Jearn 
the static model for total memory from historical data. 
Simultaneously, econometric methods (e.g . ,  an additive 
model with fixed look-back) can be used to gcnemte a 
dynamic statistical forecast for total memorv. Given the 
inference for total memory at each time step, the statistical 
forecast at each time step, and some reasonable wav of com­
bining both probabili ty distributions (cf. [Genest a�d Zidek, 
1 986]), the forecast for consumption of memory options 
becomes a matter of i nference using any one of several avail­
able algori thms for exact or approximate inference. [Dagum 
and Galper, 1995] and [Dagum and Galper et al, 1 995] pro­
vide a much ful ler exposition of the technique than we can 
give here. 
FIGURE 7. Belief net for total memory consumption. 
As our pilot studies in this area convincingly demonstrate, 
the synthesis of belief net models learned from historical 
data with statistical forecasting methodologies gives plan­
ners and analysts a powerful tool for tracking the pace and 
pulse of the market. ln particular, it allows them to test 
hypotheses by formu lating a model such as the one displayed 
in Figure 7, fitting it to available data, and then seeing how 
the model performs against historical data. A pproaches such 
as those developed in [Heckerman et al, 1995] are more 
sophisticated in that they seek to learn model structures- not 
j ust model parameters- from data. While this is clearly an 
attractive feature, one of the centml premises of SCRAM is 
to get planners and analysts to articulate their beliefs using a 
simple, evocative representation. The search for credible 
models using the belief net inference/statistical forecasting 
approach becomes an experimental exercise where planners 
and analysts work together to balance ideas and intuitions 
against numerical signal s in the data. It also provides a rigor ­
ous and surprisingly accurate means of forecasting phenom­
ena such as memory options , products with demand and 
consumption patterns which are otherwise extremely diffi­
cult to predict. 
5.0 Conclusions 
At an i nvited talk at the Decision Analysis Col loquium at 
Stanford University, Howard Raiffa, one of the founders and 
l uminaries of decision analysis (DA), stood before an audi­
ence of researchers, consultant<;,  and students and pro­
claimed his dismay at DA 's failure to exert any lasting, 
recognizable impact on current business practice. The cri­
tique was notable not j ust for its source - a man who helped 
lay the very foundations of the field - but also for its blunt­
ness. When asked why DA had so few adherents, Raiffa 
offered one central explanation : tlX) often, he said, DA had 
been presented as a col lection of mathematical axioms and 
techniques instead of as an i l lumi nating lens through which 
to view the world . He held up one of his recently publ ished 
books, a thick tome fil led with equations, theorems and 
proofs, and said, "See, this is exactly what I ' m  talking 
about! "  
DA/UAI methods are appealing because they are based on 
crisp theories (e.g. , subjective probabi l i ty, uti l ity) and 
because they maintmn a strong attention to mathematical 
n gor. In my opinion they are most attractively disti nguished, 
however, by their user interface. They provide practi tioners 
and researchers with a rich set of tools, mostly graphical i n  
nature, for expressing risk, complexi ty, and uncertainty­
w ithout necessari ly requiring a huge amount of mathemati­
cal abstraction. To make themselves useful,  other approaches 
seem to make sacrifices i n  rigor that are al together too steep. 
Fuzzy logic, for example, starts from the premise that many 
of the concepts manipulated in the service of rational action 
are i nherently fuzzy. While this may be true for some con­
cepts, the fuzzy approach does not distinguish between those 
concepts and the less troublesome cases where the concepts 
themselves are relati vely clear - the difficulty lies onl y in 
fi nding a compact way of express ing them and then tying 
them together to draw an inference or to make a decision . 
My experience in the application of SCRAM for ODM indi­
cates that, while better decision-making is of course one of 
its important benefi ts, another important benefi t is  that i t  
forces dectsion participants to impose some structure on 
what only appears to be mtnnstcal ly fuzzy. The success of 
SCRAM at Sun demonstrates that graphical models such as 
bel ief nets and i nftuence diagrams can be used on a fast, ft ex­
i ble basis to diagnose and depict the sources of disagreement 
in high-stakes business decisions. SCRAM analyses sti l l  
retain al l  the mathematical rigor and complexity we need to 
solve our problems convi ncingly. I n  contrast to OR 
approaches , the results of models constructed according to 
SCRAM are more credible because decision participants 
build them us ing familiar terms, concepts, and pictures . 
Final ly, the process first/tools second approach at Sun has 
led to a deeper understanding of the context and required 
functionalittes of the tools for decision software support we 
are building. 
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